so fellow blog types is the equality gripe over for now ?

Monkeys don't like inequality, either

"its all fair in the end gov "

"I answer that, Even as in bodies there is gravity or levity whereby they are borne to their own place which is the end of their movement, so in souls  there is merit  or demerit whereby they reach their reward or punishment, which are the ends of their deeds.


 Wherefore just as a body is conveyed at once to its place, by its gravity or levity, unless there be an obstacle, so too thesoul  the bonds of the flesh being broken, whereby it was detained in the state of the way, receives at once its reward or punishment, unless there be an obstacle

. Thus sometimes venial sin, though needing first of all to be cleansed, is an obstacle to the receiving of the reward; the result being that the reward is delayed. And since a place is assigned to souls  in keeping with their reward or punishment, as soon as the soul is set free from the body

 it is either plunged into hell  or soars to heaven
 unless
 it be held back by some debt,
 for which its flight must needs be delayed until the soul is first of all cleansed."



as i grow senile i note i mellow
  and am today as i write this
   not a very harsh judge of my fellow hu-creatures

wherefore
i take that tripartite system
hell heaven and purgatory
 to suggest very few soarings and plungings

yup i figure  most of us souls
   are headed for the mountain hike depicted below  :

brit sputter on growing inequality

http://www.resolutionfoundation.org/media/media/downloads/Gaining_from_growth_-_The_final_report_of_the_Commission_on_Living_Standards.pdf

this is the usual match stick study reort

its what is to be done adds up to plus zero

more highering up of  lower ed
more  at state expense day care
more programs to skill build
more ..

yup
supply side eye wash

pulling every one below the median...above the median

higher wages thru better skills
and more head and hands on the job for more but really flexible hours

---------------------

lets take it from another start line:


this brit report]s answers
 to the savage trends in household take home
 ---if you don't happen to have a professional degree---
are pea sized to say the least

The usual higher the lower Ed standards
Including more years of forced schooling!
the equally usual skill supply side voodoo yammering
"Make our skilled less ...skill filled "

ya ya ya
yet again
the same old same old
cries  of  Moses to the God of the burning trash bin


And of course the utterly bogus just so story
a chronic and growing
 mis match/ skill gap on the corporate demand side


one might ask here
What if The skills get built cheaper off shore ?

That needs an answer don't it mate ?

That has an answer
but its mostly about forex policy ultimately

Yes there's some profane  chatter about a broad front of transfer system policies
to raise incomes among the low waged
a few pence more for them  bottom jobsters

How about lifting
 the funding burden of all those social transfer payments
to our always with us
 low income households
       off ...yes off totally off
the low to middle   payroll class
And onto the high property class

A tax policy aimed at the scattering of economic rent sumps
so carefully nested among our institutional arrangements
 could easily replace a huge hunk of the present pay roll robbery

If the present system fails to provide good paying jobs
Them make the system's  beneficiaries pay for the the god damn
                                                                     social compensation to the losers

A close friend oft opines like this..

http://stopmebeforeivoteagain.org/2012/10/103/


"competing stories are the only things that distinguish the two contenders."


" In the fact-based world, they’re quite difficult to tell apart.
 So really, who can blame..."
(some poor low info soul )

"... for preferring a more congenial story?"

 ya there is a big slug of folks in the middle income range
that fits this portrait
                                                more or less


whats in it for ME ! what's not in it for YOU!




caught between the charybdis of  tax evading knavish  free riders
and the scylla of   hand out grabing  lazy free loaders



but there are differences on the ground
 as they say

and they are real and material even if largely unconsidered
by the paleface enrage

one straight forward example

the potus appointed  board of the NLRB

to scoff at these real material differences
to agree with the proposition
neither party has done a damn thing for the middle elements of the job class

to suggest  with scorn
the bastards  are enthralled by their misdirected fury
                           
                  as in
                          "spite makes em go  right "

to walk away mentally
to abandon the white wage class
by their  low info/ low ed  tens of millions
to getting "  what they want"
             and getting  it  " good and hard"

this fellow spirits
     is the dead wrong track to follow

 for progressive change artists caught here and choosing to stay here
                                                              inside
                                                                 the global titan's jelly belly

  let us hope
  the world of making  small differences
         reigns supreme
                              in the hearts  attached to most  thoughtful heads

me at a blog

Let's give up the ghost here and go to a progressive consumption tax
Wealth needs to be taxed directly which is unconstitutional
Unless we devise some sort of life time income mechanism
That includes gifts and inheritance
Playing tax man is fun
But realistically let's focus on triggering a wage boom thru tightening the job markets
and revamping social security
In exactly the opposite direct of tubbyTaylor's

ReplyWednesday, October 31, 2012 at 06:36 AM

Paine said in reply to Paine...

The key to both
Destroy the twin taboos of federal deficits and product price inflation
The big media could do this if it treated the task like it treats global warming even
Now the sacred fear of accumulating federal debt is universally worshiped
And us scoffers are treated like lunatics rather then enlightened heretics

Reply

report on willful walk aways and other victims of socialized usury

"Historically, the U.S. mortgage default rate has varied in the range of 0–2% over the economic cycle. However, default rates broke dramatically from this historical pattern in 2006. At the peak of the housing downturn, the aggregate default rate climbed to about 10% of mortgages. In certain geographical markets and for certain types of mortgages, such as loans to subprime borrowers, the rate exceeded 25%.
What happened to borrowers who defaulted? On the plus side, defaulting borrowers potentially got some financial breathing room. Housing expenditures are typically about 30–35% of total household income. For many overstretched borrowers, defaulting on a mortgage and becoming a renter reduced housing expenditures considerably, although the quality of their living quarters was lower. Furthermore, the extended period between mortgage default and foreclosure allowed many borrowers to remain in their homes for a while rent-free.
Of course, foreclosure is far from a positive for most borrowers. One need only look at the estimated home equity of U.S. households to realize that borrowers perceive default to be very costly. The share of homeowners with mortgage balances exceeding the value of their houses is estimated to be about 20%. Many of these underwater borrowers appear to have a financial incentive to default. The fact that most do not default suggests borrowers see other costs to walking away from their mortgages.
One of the main costs is that access to credit is restricted for borrowers who have defaulted. Relatively little research has examined how default affects borrowers. Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump, and Montriol (2009) find that certain provisions in the bankruptcy code allow borrowers who have defaulted on a mortgage to get credit cards again fairly rapidly. For mortgage borrowers, Brevoort and Cooper (2011) find that those who went through a foreclosure in the recent housing crisis experienced sharp drops in their credit scores, which appear to be long lasting. Moreover, these borrowers are more likely to default on other types of debt.

Borrower access to credit markets following a mortgage default

In this Economic Letter, we examine how long it takes individuals or a household to borrow again to buy a home after defaulting on a mortgage. To get a sense of how default affects access to mortgage markets, we look at consumer loan data from the first quarter of 1999 to the fourth quarter of 2011 collected by Equifax, a major credit reporting agency. Our analysis is based on Equifax data in the New York Federal Reserve Bank’s consumer loan file, a 5% nationally representative random sample designed to reproduce the movement of young and old consumers into and out of the credit pool (for a description, see Lee and Van der Klaauw 2010). We define default as a mortgage that terminates when, in the final quarter it is observed, it is either 120 days past due or severely derogatory, meaning it is past due and reported to have a charge-off or foreclosure.
We treat access to credit as a decision more or less made by lenders. In other words, at what point are they willing to lend again to a borrower with a tarnished history? In reality, borrowers may not want credit. The data only show the quantity of credit outstanding. They do not directly indicate credit demand or supply, although some inferences regarding credit supply can be made.
In addition, important institutional restrictions affect credit following mortgage default or foreclosure, especially mortgage borrowing. People with a major derogatory event on their credit history, such as foreclosure or bankruptcy, typically can’t qualify for a conventional loan securitized through government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac until four to seven years have elapsed, depending on circumstances surrounding the event. This restriction does not completely preclude lending to borrowers who have recently defaulted. A lender has the option of making the loan and keeping it on its own balance sheet instead of selling it to one of the GSEs. However, the GSEs own or guarantee the vast majority of new mortgages, which makes the restriction a powerful barrier keeping defaulters from returning to the market.

Figure 1
Cumulative rate of return to mortgage market

Source: FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax and author's calculations.

The Equifax data confirm that a prior mortgage default has a large effect on future access to mortgage credit. Figure 1 shows the rate at which borrowers with different credit histories return to the mortgage market following a termination or exit. Termination is defined as having a zero mortgage balance after having a positive mortgage balance.
The blue line in Figure 1 plots the rate for returning to the mortgage market for borrowers with no prior defaults or foreclosures. We do not know why these borrowers terminated their mortgages. They could have moved, or adjusted their housing expenditures by trading up or downsizing. Or they could have paid down their mortgages and now own their houses outright. We might expect that most borrowers who have paid off their mortgages will never return to the market. Indeed, 12 years after a termination, just above 35% of borrowers with no prior defaults have taken out new mortgages. This number may seem low. But, as the red line in Figure 1 shows, it is much higher than the average rate at which borrowers with prior defaults return to the mortgage market over the same time horizon.

Figure 2
Return to mortgage market following defaults

Note: Cumulative rate, variation by default vintage.

Source: FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax and author's calculations.

Figure 2 shows the rates at which borrowers who defaulted on mortgages in 2001, 2003, or 2008 returned to the market. The figure plots the cumulative percentage of defaulters who have a new mortgage within a given number of quarters after their last default. Even though a short amount of time has passed since the 2008 cohort defaulted, their return to the housing market appears to be significantly slower than for cohorts that defaulted in the two earlier years. The low rate of return for the 2008 cohort could be related to demand. In the 2001 and 2003 cohorts, there was very strong overall demand for housing, as evidenced by the strong run-up in the rate of homeownership during the 2000s. But the Great Recession that began in 2007 was much deeper than the 2001 recession, and uncertainty about jobs or future income prospects may have made people unwilling or unable to demand housing at the rate seen after previous recessions.
However, the 2008 cohort’s slow return to the mortgage market could also reflect tight credit supply. The mortgage finance system was severely disrupted during the financial crisis of 2007–08. The 2009 and 2010 mortgage default cohorts look very similar to the 2008 group, although they are not shown in Figure 2. By contrast, the credit environment for the 2001 and 2003 cohorts was very different in the years after their defaults. Loan terms were generally easy and subprime mortgage lending boomed.

Figure 3
Return to mortgage market by initial credit score

Source: FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax and author's calculations.

Economic growth was solid and interest rates low in the decade following the 2001 recession. But Figure 2 shows that, even in these good times, it took a long time for defaulted borrowers to return to the housing market. About two-thirds of the borrowers in the 2001 cohort had still not come back within 10 years.
Figure 3 shows the rates of return to the mortgage market according to the borrower’s initial credit score. Borrowers who defaulted in any year within the sample are included and are divided into two groups: those with credit scores above 650, labeled prime, and those with scores of 650 and below, labeled subprime. The credit scores used are borrowers’ first scores after taking out mortgages on which they eventually defaulted.

Figure 4
Return to mortgage market by type of foreclosure

Source: FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax and author's calculations.

Interestingly, the experiences of the subprime and prime groups in the two years following foreclosure are similar. This is probably because the borrowers we label as prime are no longer in that category after foreclosure. Indeed, Brevoort and Cooper (2010) show that, regardless of pre-foreclosure credit score, the typical borrower who goes through foreclosure ends up with a credit score below 600. Figure 3 also shows that, after about two years, borrowers who were in the prime group before foreclosure begin to return to the mortgage market at significantly faster rates than those in the subprime cohort. All the same, the majority of prime borrowers do not return to the mortgage market within our sample period.
Are there important differences in the rate of return to the mortgage market across different types of markets? Figure 4 shows that one distinction that does not appear to matter much is the type of foreclosure law, that is, whether the borrower lives in a judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure state. This is surprising. Judicial foreclosures, in which the foreclosure must be pursued through the courts, are much more time-consuming and costly than nonjudicial foreclosures, in which the lender can serve the borrower with a notice of foreclosure and proceed to reclaim the house. All else equal, borrowers in judicial foreclosure states would be expected to be denied credit for longer periods.

What explains the timing of the return to the mortgage market?

The rate at which borrowers get new mortgages after defaulting on a mortgage is low. Only 30% of borrowers who defaulted in 2001 had taken out another mortgage within 10 years. What explains the pace of return to the mortgage market? Overall economic conditions appear to play an important role in allowing borrowers who have defaulted to return to the market. When we control for factors such as local unemployment rates and past house price appreciation, we find that these variables influence the rate at which defaulters come back to the mortgage market. Overwhelmingly though, the best predictor of when a defaulting borrower returns to the market is the change in the borrower’s credit score. Our research finds that, after five years, borrowers who return to the mortgage market after a default have experienced a more-than-100 point increase in their score.

Conclusion

Evidence suggests that the process of regaining creditworthiness is lengthy. Borrowers who terminated their mortgages for reasons other than default returned to the market about two-and-a-half times faster than those who defaulted. This has important implications for the housing recovery. The improvement in the housing market is often assumed to reflect significant pent-up demand. But an estimated 4 million foreclosures have taken place since 2007. The consumers who went through those foreclosures will return to homeownership only gradually, suggesting that mortgage supply will also be a factor in the housing recovery."